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I am writing about a film and a term. More specifically I am writing about a film and its relation to 
different dynamics of love.
It is called pièce touchée. It is by the Austrian filmmaker Martin Arnold. It was made in 1989. 
The film is an analysis of a pre-existing film. More specifically it is a sixteen-minute frame by frame 
analysis of an eighteen-second sequence from a 1954 film titled The Human Jungle. In Arnold’s 
filmic analysis the sequence is taken apart and put back together in a process of destruction and 
recomposition. Using an optical printer Arnold duplicates frames from the original and re-organises 
their order to provide his extended analysis. Using this process Arnold renders a transformative 
observation; multiplying and re-ordering the film frames to stress and twist the original’s narrative, 
running the film backwards and forwards in short rhythmic bursts. In this process the film length 
is greatly extended (from eighteen seconds to sixteen minutes) while the gestures are contracted 
and condensed into spasmodic convulsions.
In this film seemingly simple movement becomes a syncopated series of micro-convulsions.
In this film a woman is pictured sitting in a comfortably decorated room, a living room. 
Reading. Waiting. This scene is presented for a long period of time with a minimal gesture; for 
the first minutes of the film only her finger seems to move. It twitches. It fidgets. Gradually, more 
movements animate the scene. First the door behind the woman opens a crack. Then it closes. This 
is repeated until finally a man begins to emerge, seeming to struggle with his own trajectory and the 
door itself. As the woman waits in the domestic interior the man returns, penetrating into the space 
through this reluctant aperture. Whilst this action happens the woman turns her head to see what 
is happening behind her (the man turns a knob, flicks a light switch). All the while the film runs 
back and forth, the scene at times flipping and flopping – left becoming right and vice versa. The 
door opens and closes. The light turns off and on. Binary divisions are emphasised and emplaced. 








To continue a description of a scene. A woman waits. A man enters a room. They greet. They 
kiss. He walks into the room. She rises and follows. This simple scenario is extended, distended, 
reversed, with actions repeated and narrative progress denied. In conclusion the couple lean 
together to (almost) repeat a kiss we saw as part of the flurry of (in)action many minutes before. The 
film cuts to black followed by a title screen before their lips can touch again.
With pièce touchée we encounter a cinema re-visioned in the form of a faltering and pulsatile 
movement-image. What we encounter is a form of reading gone awry.  We might more accurately 
call this film the re-counting of a scene of love. 
To witness a pragmatic account of the status of number in this re-count we can look at the 
process of its construction. Arnold remarks that the structure of frames in pièce touchée is processed 
in a strictly numerical fashion: 
I work with a more-or-less continuous forward and backward motion. I start with 
frame x, go forward to frame x + 1 and then from x +1 back again through x to 
x – 1 […] If I had chosen a different process, there might have been jumps in the 
motion.1
From frames that march forward in order – such as 1, 2, 3 - we arrive with Arnold’s 
re-counting, at something akin to 1, 2, 1, 0. From the implied unity of illusion that the progression 
1, 2, 3 gives us, we are presented with a running back and forth, a limping asymmetric progression 
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that goes by way of regression. 
The process of this film transforms a simple action – such as entering into a room, or the 
delivery of a kiss – into a distended and distorted set of relations. This could be described as 
torsion, the twisting and stretching of a linear narrative under mechanical stress. The original is 
not interrupted but rather folded into itself as an immanent form of intervention. Arnold is keen 
to stress that there is no cut in the narrative, no finite interruption, but rather an interminable 
progression and regression, a repeated and continual running backwards and forwards where once 
fluid motion becomes an irregular sexualised vibration. The sound of the film – a micro-loop of the 
door opening that sounds like a pulverising engine – distorts any clear temporal progression that 
moves definitively from A to B. It mires the audience in a perpetual present that evokes a ‘now-now-
now’ that incessantly moves but does not ever truly change, conjuring a situation Fredric Jameson 
describes as the postmodern condition of having no connection to the past whilst being without 
any conceivable future.2 
Referring to the Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State by Frederick Engels we 
find a significant historical reading of the oscillating temporality of the couple, the subject under 
Arnold’s analytic scrutiny. Engels notes: 
Monogamous marriage comes on the scene as the subjugation of the one sex by 
the other […] Monogamous marriage was a great historical step forward; nevertheless, 
together with slavery and private wealth, it opens the period that has lasted un-
til today in which every step forward is also relatively a step backward, in which 
prosperity and development for some is won through the misery and frustration of 
others.3 
A step forwards that is also a step backwards is the historical condition that Engels assigns to 
monogamous couple. This double-step is found in the temporal image-manifestation that Arnold 
produces in pièce touchée. This logic can be found in Arnold’s own remarks on his work: 
We are familiar with stepping forwards and backwards in life: taking ‘two steps 
forward and one step back’ is associated with insecurity. When a body trembles, we 
perceive anxiety or nervousness. My filmic interventions infuse the characters’ actions 
with tic-like twitchings, that once in a while become so dominant as to seemingly 
create new actions out of themselves.4
To situate this film in the date of its completion is also appropriate. 1989 is the date that 
Francis Fukuyama pronounces as the end of history, a time when the struggles of ideology were 
replaced by ‘economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental 
concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands’.5 In contrast to Fukuyama we 
might encounter Alain Badiou’s characterisation of the period post-1976 (perhaps most engrained 
by the events of 1989) as a time of restoration defined by a prohibition of thinking a new world, with 
the ‘tomorrow’ of the ‘new man’ [sic] replaced by family values and economics.
Today, it seems that ‘modernisation,’ as our masters like to call it, amounts to 
being a good little dad, a good little mum, a good little son, to becoming an efficient 
employee, enriching oneself as much as possible, and playing at the responsible 
citizen. This is the new motto: ‘Money, Family, Elections.’
The century concludes on the motif of the impossibility of subjective novelty 
and the comfort of repetition. This motif has a categorical name: obsession. The 
century ends with the obsession of security, under the dominance of the following, 
rather abject maxim: It really not that bad being where you are already; it is, and has 
been, worse elsewhere.6
 
To read Badiou with Fukuyama I propose that we find Arnold’s pièce touchée with 
its auditory perpetual present and obsessive actions. The central motifs of this work are the 
foundational figures of the family and the ‘state’ form of love (Badiou’s name for the couple-form) 
alongside a manifest work of calculation, a filmic work of number-crunching in a frame-by-frame 
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approach. To transpose ‘money, family, elections’ to pièce touchée is also to see its consequences: 
obsession aligned with repetition and (in)security. This obsession is produced in a hypertrophic 
fashion as Arnold puts himself to the task of exaggerated and extensive calculation. 
To talk of Arnold re-counting a love scene in this way it is possible to ask what kind of love do 
we see at work in this film. What form of love is manifested in relation to this statist representation 
of love? We can ask these questions as pièce touchée does not seem to be of the devotional order. It 
does not seem to offer devotional love but seems instead to recount a love scene as one of crisis 
and contradiction by inserting anxious affect into a site of seeming security, this arising by means 
of stepping backwards and forwards into this scene of a man coming home to a woman.
We might instead tentatively call this film a manifestation of love as fidelity, a fidelity to the 
event of a frame-by-frame approach found in alternative cinema, and in particular in the approach 
of Peter Kubelka, an Austrian filmmaker of a previous generation strongly associated with what has 
become known as structural film. Arnold’s frame-by-frame approach is indicative of Peter Kubelka’s 
intervallic notion of cinema. Such a notion relocates attention from the relations between shots to 
the space or interval between frames. Here it is the collision between frames that provides the space 
of cinema, the collision between things in which articulation happens: ‘One word alone is one word 
alone, but when you put two words, it’s between the two words… that is your articulation’.7 Arnold 
acknowledges this frame-by-frame approach as a formative interest but one that comes to him 
without its previous utopian coloration. Arnold poses pièce touchée as an intervallic enquiry of what 
seems stalled (or at a standstill) in the present: ‘In the eighties, people paused and questioned why 
the paradigms of progress and emancipation had failed so utterly in so many respects. The issue is 
no longer what should be, but what is and was’.8 
The model of interval that provides the mechanics of film has inspired much fidelity and 
passion (as well as bad faith and factional division) in alternative cinema. Sergei Eisenstein’s 
conception of montage poses the interval as the site of a dialectical collision of images. Following 
his dictum, montage is not a linkage of one idea to another – not Pudovkin’s brick by brick 
approach used to demonstrate, or expound, a concept – instead it is ‘[a] view that from the 
collision of two given factors arises a concept […] So montage is conflict’.9 This is in contrast to 
Dziga Vertov’s model of the interval that proposes cinema as movement, with the interval as the 
transition from one movement to another. In this model the interval is part of a cinema of rhythm 
and movement; a foregrounding of a kind of inhuman perception that is a product of machinic 
assemblage as well as an enunciation of revolutionary consciousness. As Gilles Deleuze reads it: 
‘For Vertov, the dialectic is in matter and of matter, and can only reconcile a non-human perception 
with the overman of the future, material community and formal communism’.10 This articulation of 
the interval becoming apprehensible to show the material form of film against the ‘realist’ illusion 
of cinema becomes, in the history of experimental film, a militant tendency, something to which 
filmmakers commit themselves. Such is the backdrop to thinking about Arnold’s films, a backdrop 
of filmic fidelity to the interval often claimed as the radical truth of cinema. The interval might be 
thought of as a form of militant love.
It is possible to call this militant love a hatred of the ideal of the representational regime that 
is often named Hollywood. To complicate this we might also say that a relation of love and hate 
is found in what Laura Mulvey describes as ‘the long love affair/despair between image and 
self-image which has found such intensity of expression in film and such joyous recognition in 
the cinema audience’.11 This drama of jubilant misrecognition of the self in the ideal image is that 
process which Lacan describes as the ‘flutter of jubilant activity’ of the mirror stage.12 
 The scene of the mirror-stage or phase operates through two conjoined terms: narcissism 
(as self love) linked to aggressivity (as jealousy, hatred and violence). Lacan would come to name 
this correlation of love and hate in identification as hainamoration, a neologism of hate and enamore 
(enamoured), a confusion of being in hate and of being in love.13 To pose hainamoration as a term 
alongside pièce touchée is to first evoke the militant tendency of experimental film that just loves to 
hate Hollywood. It is also to pose the problematic condition of identification with the ideal image, 
a process of embroiled love and hate that is embedded in the very structure of the Hollywood film, 
a process revealed in pièce touchée’s fluttering and flickering movement.
If we are to call this work, this pièce touchée, a work of filmic analysis we must also contend 
3Transmission: Hospitality Conference. 1-3 July 2010. Sheffield Hallam University Transmission: Hospitality Conference. 1-3 July 2010. Sheffield Hallam University
with yet another modality of love. Jane Gallop remarks that when making analytical critiques of 
art works and objects in the world – or more precisely, when engaging in acts of interpretation – 
analysts-as-critics should be aware both of the violence that interpretation applies to the 
mute object and also of the mute transference that draws them to this object in the first place. Her 
concern is that we remain alert to that moment where ‘we experience not only the object’s force 
but also our own powerful drive to understand, to possess, that which moves us so intensely’.14 
To continue on the subject of love in analysis, we might recall that Jacques Lacan remarks: ‘People 
have done nothing but speak of love in analytic discourse’.15 Such a passionate dynamic 
complicates models of criticality in which the presupposition is made that analysis occurs in the 
state of cold neutrality untainted by partiality. Love might be said to surface as the fly in the soup 
of objectivity. Or, as Slavoj Žižek is keen to remind us, ‘love is a kind of radical imbalance’ and as 
such an imbalance love can unhinge the world, re-drawing its co-ordinates.16 
As a work of analysis pièce touchée is a work of transformative violence that is made in the 
context of love: on the statist idealised representation of love, in the dynamic of hainamoration and 
perhaps as an act of (militant/analytical) love. As Lacan describes it, the work of analysis is directed 
towards ‘knots of imaginary servitude that love must always untie anew or sever’.17 To extend this 
reading I turn here to the ‘work of love’ that Žižek uses in reference to the revolutionary figures of 
Che Guevara and St Paul. Addressing Guevara’s dictum that ‘the true revolutionary is guided by 
strong feelings of love’, Žižek suggests that the aim of revolutionary violence is not to bring about 
or restore harmony, but it is to be associated with violence as such as it is this activity ‘(the violent act 
of discarding, of establishing a difference, of drawing a line of separation) which liberates. Freedom 
is not a blissfully neutral state of harmony and balance, but the very violent act which disturbs this 
balance’.18 In another mode Žižek declares love as ‘the hard and arduous work of repeated ‘uncoupling’ 
in which, again and again, we have to disengage ourselves from the inertia that constrains us to 
identify with the particular order we were born into’.19 Love in this sense is expressed through a 
struggle that works towards an articulation of division and difference. Love here is a scene or a 
process of struggle, a scene where unity is displaced by a division, by an uncoupling; a scene where 
the One of unity becomes the Two of division, or Two as relation thought other than totality or 
wholeness. To think of love and the Two is to think otherwise than the lover who makes one 
complete. It is to think of a mode of love that opens one up to the experience of incompletion and 
new horizons.
To pose love as the work of arduous uncoupling I will turn in conclusion to Alain Badiou’s 
theory of love. No other theory of love has so arduously uncoupled love from the couple, the scene 
where two (people) become one (the family unit, this principle of unity). Opposing this unifying 
love Badiou proposes a notion of love that is predicated on the impossibility of fusion in the sexual 
relation as theorised by Lacan. Concentrating on this impossibility or this non-relation Badiou 
positions love as the scene of the Two that frees itself from the powers of the One. 
The One to which Badiou refers is the supra-numeric principle of unity. We find this state 
of unity in the couple bound together in romantic fusion, as well as in the idealised and whole 
image.20 Against this unity – this anxious mirage of wholeness – is what Badiou names the scene of 
the Two, a conception of love as a production zone that is not a state of being, nor a state form. Love 
here is both a disjunctive chance encounter and the construction of a new duration, the encountering 
of a new perspective and the commitment – or fidelity – to such a perspective. Love for Badiou is 
precisely not found in fusion (where two becomes one: ‘Love is not that which from a Two taken as 
structurally given creates a One of ecstasy’), but is found instead in disjunction where the one (or 
the mythic One of identity) is rendered incomplete through an experience of the Two (where the 
imaginary opens up to the possibility of the new in an encounter with the real).21 Love here is a 
struggle against fusion, inertia, identity and points us towards an experience of the world, as Badiou 
tells us that ‘love is not even an experience of the other, but an experience of the world, or of the 
situation, under the postevental condition that there are Two’.22
To recount this supra-numerical Two, it might not only stand for two people, or for the space 
that separates them. For Badiou, in his Theory of the Subject, it has stood for the process of dialectics as 
struggle, posed against the unity of metaphysics. In his Manifesto for Philosophy it arrives as infinite 
or incompletable experience, the encounter of the ‘irremediable excess with respect to the law of 
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the One’.23 In his The Century we encounter the Two as the unleashing of politics rather than the 
enforcement of a pre-emptive peace in his discussion of Chinese politics. More specifically, even 
more cinematically, this Two might be rendered, as Lacan does, as d’eux, ‘of them’ or ‘between 
them’. Two as deux reformulated as d’eux comes to stand for the ‘between’, the numerical equivalent 
of the interval not just of film but also of all social relations. Alenka Zupančič notes that in order to 
start counting properly, Lacan advises us to start at Two: 
Lacan refers to 2 not as though to yet another number (the ‘second one’), but as the 
(numeric) signifier of the Other […] Lacan endeavours to define the Other by claim-
ing that here, so to speak, we start to count at 2. As far as the Other is concerned, 2 
is the first number that we are forced to reckon (with) – that is to say, we start with 
a split as such, with a non-coincidence of the same.24 
The task for love here is how to go beyond oneself (the One-self) and to truly love the Other, 
that which Lacan describes as the One-missing, the One-too-few, l’un-en-moins.25
To pose Arnold’s pièce touchée with Badiou and the scene of love (as interval, as excess, as 
disjunction, as duration) might be to re-locate this work on (or of) love as revealing a void, a work 
of disjunctive encounter that re-counts a One for a Two, that foregoes the count 1, 2, 3… for the 
re-count of 1, 2, 1, 0. Or as Badiou counts it: ‘Such is the numericity of the amorous procedure: One, 
Two, Infinity’.26 Even more specifically we might think of it as the work of forming a new temporality. 
Against the perpetual present that advocates a frenzied inertia – a tempo that Arnold reveals in its 
full horror – we might think of how the work addresses the need for a new sense of temporality, of 
the possible experience of another duration. Badiou writes: ‘Love invents a new way to last in life 
[…] it’s the wish for an unknown duration’.27 
To finish I repeat that Arnold’s pièce touchée re-counts a love scene. I would contend that this 
re-count of love is directed from the state of the One towards a scene of the Two, from a state of 
unity to the experience of incompletion and disjunction. I would further speculate that pièce touchée 
reminds us to ask ourselves what it means to love. Trapped between irony as perpetual displacement 
and the fear of commitment perhaps our task is to find out what we can do with love. To think of 
love as the work that uncouples us from inertia and that provokes us to see the world in a 
different/divided perspective may provide the beginning co-ordinates for this task as well as the 
tools to sustain its interminable and infinite labour.
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